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SUMMARY
The volatile political and security environment of Northern Ireland has for 26 years focused
attention on tackling the, so far, intractable constitutional question of its position within the
United Kingdom and the island of Ireland. The collapse of the IRA ceasefire in February 1996
and fears of a possible return to violence by Protestant paramilitaries have heightened
tensions. This protracted period of violence has deflected attention away from a system of
public service administration in Northern Ireland characterized by serious problems of
accountability. Essential public services operate under the aegis of appointed boards, and the
major repository of power, under a system of Direct Rule from Westminster, is the Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland, a British Cabinet Minister. Under a recent European initiative
(the EC Peace and Reconciliation Programme, 1995) an alternative model of service delivery
provides a major opportunity for administrative reform in Northern Ireland. This model is
based on a partnership approach in which councillors, the private and voluntary sectors
collaborate to deliver services. Although still in its early stages, this approach could sever the
link between political progress and administrative change which has contributed for too long
to the ‘democratic deficit’ in Northern Ireland. # 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
INTRODUCTION
The changing and volatile political milieu in Northern Ireland deflects attention from
a system of public service administration characterized by serious problems of
accountability. Pending the outcome of the constitutional proposals under discussion
at the time of writing, essential public services operate under the aegis of appointed
boards, and the major repository of power, under a system of Direct Rule from
Westminster, is the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, a British Cabinet
Minister. One commentator described the system thus:
Apart from what are little more than parish councils, Northern Ireland’s
all-embracing public sector is ruled either personally by British Ministers or
boards appointed by them. For 20 years no ruler of Northern Ireland has
been elected by its people. In no reputable sense of the term is Northern
Ireland a democracy. It is a colony. Its people react as colonial people
normally react, by turning to the political extremes (Jenkins, 1993).
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It is perhaps ironic that the Northern Ireland civil rights campaign of 1968,1 designed
to address some of the inequities in public administration, contributed, in part, to a
system of Direct Rule which has exacerbated, in a dierent form, problems of local
accountable governance (Buckland, 1981; Whyte, 1990). Throughout the period of
Direct Rule, citizens of Northern Ireland have acquiesced in a system of public service
provision euphemistically described as having a ‘democratic deficit’. Whilst the
abuse of powers by erstwhile public bodies (particularly local authorities) in service
delivery played a major part in the creation of the present system of administration in
Northern Ireland, this has been compounded by government policies in Great
Britain, adopted in the Province, which have eroded local democracy and contributed
to the growth of quangos and other non-elected public bodies.
This article begins by describing the current system of public administration in
Northern Ireland and highlights the inherent weaknesses in accountability. It then
considers public service provision by local government, as the only remaining demo-
cratic forum, and the potential for enhancing its role in the absence of devolved
powers. The European model of service provision, exemplified by the EC Special
Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation launched in July 1995, is used to
illustrate a partnership approach within local government. Finally, the article
considers the potential of this EC service provision model as a means of enhancing
local accountability and creating a sense of community ownership, where apathy and
impotence are the norm, in the face of improved governance inextricably linked to an
overall political settlement.
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND
The current system of public administration in Northern Ireland is a product of the
political turmoil from the late 1960s onwards and its consequences for the machinery
of government. The imposition of Direct Rule under the Northern Ireland
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1972, following the resignation of the Northern Ireland
Government, led the United Kingdom Government to assume full and direct
responsibility for its administration under the newly created post of Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland (Ditch, 1977; Birrell, 1978). Direct Rule, despite the passage of
time, remains a temporary phenomenon renewable annually by the United Kingdom
Parliament. As a consequence, it has incrementally embedded a system of unaccount-
able public administration in Northern Ireland, conceived initially as short-term, and
inextricably linked the future developments of service delivery to progress on the
1The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) was established in February 1967 to spearhead a
campaign for civil rights for Catholics. Its basic aims were: one man (sic), one vote in council elections; the
ending of gerrymandered electoral boundaries; machinery to prevent discrimination by public authorities
and to deal with complaints; the fair allocation of public housing; the repeal of the Special Powers Act; and
the disbandment of the ‘B’ Specials. The Cameron Commission (1969), appointed by the Northern Ireland
Government to investigate the causes and circumstances of the violence, found seven general causes of the
disorder. Six of these were Catholic grievances about housing, discrimination, gerrymandering, the ‘B’
Specials, the Special Powers Act and the failure to get any redress of complaints—and one was Protestant
fear of the threat posed by an increase in Catholic populations and powers.
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constitutional/security fronts. A senior civil servant in the Northern Ireland Oce,
describing the durability of administrative structures, noted:
As long as Direct Rule continues, then the organization (of government
administration) is less likely to be fundamentally modified, although
previous experience suggests that there will continue to be changes at the
margin (Bell, 1987, p. 225).
The Secretary of State, the Westminster cabinet minister responsible for Northern
Ireland, has direction and control of Northern Ireland departments, for which she
is accountable to Parliament, and introduces Northern Ireland legislation at
Westminster, generally through Orders in Council. Orders in Council are a type of
delegated legislation introduced under a procedure which allows limited parliamen-
tary time for debate and permits no amendments. They must be accepted or rejected
in their entirety (Hadfield, 1990).2 Working through the Northern Ireland Oce
(NIO), the Secretary of State therefore has overall responsibility for the government
of Northern Ireland. She is directly involved with political and constitutional matters,
security policy and broad economic questions. The major functional areas of govern-
ment, law and order, economic development, education, health and social services
and the environment are shared amongst the other ministers. The ministerial team has
a constituency base in England and none has electoral accountability to the citizens of
Northern Ireland. The situation has been summarized as follows:
With the exception of the short-lived Executive3 interlude in 1974, the
ability of local politicians to influence the government and administration
of Northern Ireland has been extremely limited. The diminished role of
local government, the heavy reliance on a range of intermediate bodies to
provide a wide range of public goods and services and the bluntness of the
Order in Council procedure adopted at Westminster to deal with legislation
aecting the Province, all combined to give the regime of Direct Rule an
impermeable character (O’Leary et al., 1988, p. 86).
The establishment of the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1982, as a mechanism for
‘rolling devolution’ in which local politicians were gradually to assume executive
powers, oered some prospect for local accountability. The Assembly scrutinized the
work of Northern Ireland government departments and, like Select Committees in
Westminster, could call for papers, persons and records to assist their enquiries.
Observers of the Assembly concluded that its potential for executive scrutiny was
governed by the commitment of the Secretary of State to provide the means to
undertake this role. The impression was that the Secretary of State could delimit its
capacity to act. This gained plausibility when ministers called before the Assembly
2In a debate in the House of Commons on ministerial accountability in Northern Ireland, a Minister
described the Order in Council procedure as the ‘least bad way of legislating for the Province’ (Hanley,
1991, p. 663). Whilst conceding that it was unsatisfactory and did not provide the degree of accountability
aorded to Bills presented to Parliament, he defended the process which allowed prior consultation on
proposed draft orders.
3This is a reference to the first attempt to secure constitutional reform following the introduction of Direct
Rule when a Northern Ireland Assembly was elected by proportional representation and a power-sharing
Executive formed from its members. Grassroots Protestants made it clear, through a general strike, that
they would accept no dealings with the Republic in a Council of Ireland, nor would they share power with
Catholics. The power-sharing Executive collapsed in 1974.
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treated their appearance as no more than a public relations exercise, in the knowledge
that they were not accountable to this forum (O’Leary et al., 1988).
With the demise of the Assembly in 1986, scrutiny of central government functions
reverted to Select Committees in Westminster. Their coverage of Northern Ireland
matters, however, was either fragmentary or non-existent and this remained the case
until December 1993, when, 24 hours after the Downing Street Declaration4 was
announced, the government flagged its intention to set up a Northern Ireland Aairs
Select Committee. Opponents of the UK Government saw this as the price paid to
Unionists for their support over the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, ‘to save the
Government’s bacon over Maastricht and . . . a sop to get Unionists to acquiesce
in the Downing Street Declaration’ (McGrady, 1994, pp. 359–360). The Northern
Ireland Aairs Select Committee5 was set up in 1994 to scrutinize the work in
Northern Ireland government departments and their associated bodies, the same
remit as Select Committees in Great Britain and their respective departments. Early
indications are that the eorts of the Northern Ireland Aairs Select Committee are
‘positively sluggish’ and, according to one Northern Ireland member, ‘intent on
dealing with non-controversial matters as they don’t want it turning into a boxing
ring, and I suspect that part of it is protection of Northern Ireland Oce ministers’
(quoted in Wilford and Elliott, 1995, p. 220).
The lack-lustre performance of the Northern Ireland Aairs Select Committee has
done little to address the ‘democratic deficit’ charge and the perception that major
services of government are presided over by absentee English ministers who neither
fully understand nor care, electorally, about local governance in Northern Ireland. As
one Northern Ireland MP quipped, drawing from third-party comments made to a
commission considering devolution:
Government ocers and ministers should be located in relation to the
individual citizen in such a way that an angry farmer could take a bus, visit
the relevant minister, horsewhip him and get back home before nightfall
(Trimble, 1991, pp. 660–661).
Apart from the general arguments of accountability, the plethora of bodies which
constitute the structure of public administration in Northern Ireland—central
government departments, government agencies, boards, quangos and local govern-
ment—create confusion in the minds of the public as to which tier of government is
specifically responsible for service provision. This administrative amalgam and
attendant problems of accountability are considered in more detail.
4The Anglo–Irish Joint (Downing Street) Declaration was agreed between the then Republic of Ireland
Taoiseach, Albert Reynolds, and the then British Prime Minister, John Major. It set out an agreed
framework devised by both governments and committed them to promote co-operation at all levels on the
basis of fundamental principles, undertakings, obligations under international agreements and guarantees
that each government had given and rearmed, including Northern Ireland’s statutory constitutional
guarantee. It was described as the starting point of a peace process designed to culminate in a political
settlement.
5The Select Committee comprised at its formation: six Conservatives, two Labour, two Ulster Unionists,
one DUP, one Popular Unionist and one SDLP—a row erupted about its representativeness.
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UNACCOUNTABLE LOCAL GOVERNANCE
The United KingdomGovernment’s policies for Northern Ireland prioritize strength-
ening the economy and targeting social need,6 whilst simultaneously achieving peace
and stability (Department of Finance and Personnel and HM Treasury, 1995;
Osborne, 1996). These policies are enacted through six government departments
(Agriculture, Economic Development, Environment, Education, Health and Social
Services, Finance and Personnel) and the Northern Ireland Oce (see the Appendix).
The planned expenditure for 1995–1996 was approximately £7.7b and was allocated
into the main programme areas as shown in Figure 1.
If one considers, as an example, the largest element of resource allocation, health
and personal social services and social security (Department of Health and Social
Services (DHSS)), accounting for 49% of public expenditure, the scale of the
accountability problem is obvious. In Northern Ireland, integrated health and social
services are supplied by four health and social services boards, health trusts, general
practitioner fund-holders and the Central Services Agency.7 The present adminis-
trative structure follows a review of the National Health Service (UK) in a White
Paper entitled Working for Patients (1989). This made proposals designed to raise
standards, improve the quality and eectiveness of the services available, make them
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Law and Order (12%)
Agriculture and Fisheries (4%)
Trade and Employment (7%)
Roads and Transport (2%)
Housing (3%)
Environmental Services (4%)
Education, Arts and Libraries (18%)
Health and Personal Social Services (19%)
Social Security (30%)
Other Public Services (1%)
Figure 1. 1995–1996 NI public expenditure.
6Targeting Social Need is a government initiative that tackles areas of social and economic dierences by
targeting government policies and programmes more directly at those areas or sections of the community
suering the highest levels of disadvantage and deprivation. Underpinning this approach is the assertion
that community dierentials, or greater levels of disadvantage among Catholics (unemployment, educa-
tion, skills), contribute to divisions in the population. These dierential experiences sustain feelings of
disadvantage, discrimination and alienation, which in turn influence Catholic attitudes to political and
security issues. Under this initiative, £174m has been allocated to Making Belfast Work, £21m to the
Londonderry Initiative and £10–11m per year to the improvement of community relations.
7The Central Services Agency administers, on behalf of the Health and Social Services Boards, the Family
Health Services which comprise the general medical, dental, ophthalmic and pharmaceutical services
provided by independent practitioners.
Partnership in Northern Ireland 155
# 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Public Admin. Dev. 18, 151–168 (1998)
more responsive to patients’ and clients’ needs and make the best use of available
resources. The government aimed to achieve this by the maximum devolution of
operational decision-taking to those involved in the management of services at local
level, and by the separation of the functions of commissioning and provision of
services. Central to this was a new contractual system whereby the commissioners and
providers of services agree on the precise quality and cost of services to be secured to
meet the needs of patients and clients. Under the reforms, hospitals and other units
were given greater responsibility and freedom of action and were able to apply for
trust status within the health service.8 In April 1991 the Health and Social Services
Boards were reconstituted as four smaller management-oriented bodies comprising
executive and non-executive members.
This internal market, designed to separate the assessment of need and purchasing
of services from the delivery of these services, came into operation in April 1992. The
four health and social services boards, as agents of the DHSS,9 commission and
purchase health and social care for their resident populations from a range of
providers—health and social services trusts, the voluntary and private sectors.
General practitioners’ practices can also opt to be fund-holder units with their own
budgets to purchase a defined range of hospital and community services from pro-
viders. A total of 14 health and social services trusts were fully operational in
Northern Ireland from April 1995, accounting for approximately 70% of health
and personal social services revenue (Department of Finance and Personnel and
HM Treasury, 1995).
Advocates of the new internal market system in health care argue that its whole
rationale is driven by responding to consumers through needs assessment, contract
specification and competition to provide services (Waldegrave, 1993). This is rein-
forced by a consumer safeguard in the form of the Citizen’s Charter (Charter for
Patients and Clients), which sets out how services will be expected to respond to
individuals’ needs, and the standards of care and treatment patients and clients can
reasonably expect to receive. Yet health provision does not operate in perfect market
conditions when there is an asymmetric relationship between professionals and clients
on health expertise and information. As Wall argues:
The present arrangements only reinforce the view that an oligarchy is
managing public aairs in the interests of professionals and managers
rather than the general public (Wall, 1996, p. 76).
Hence there are general problems of accountability which are not addressed by
moves towards a greater market orientation. In Northern Ireland this situation is
exacerbated by the administrative structure within which health care is delivered.
8A health service trust is a corporate body with a chairman and board of executive and non-executive
directors. Once established, each trust assumes responsibility within a defined area for the ownership and
management of hospitals or other establishments or facilities previously managed or provided by health
and social services boards.
9Part of the reform process involved a review of the DHSS with the aim of separating its policy and
management roles. It is now divided into three sections: (1) HPSS Policy and Strategy Command which
develops policies and legislation and funds a number of centrally financed services; (2) HPSS Management
Executive which is responsible for the allocation of resources and develops, at regional level, a strategic
management agenda for the delivery of eective, ecient and high-quality care and treatment; and (3)
Professional Groups which provide informed medical, nursing, dental, pharmaceutical and social services
advice to the policy and executive arms of the DHSS.
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Three key problems of accountability arise from this system of service delivery in
Northern Ireland. First, in the reorganization of the four health and social services
boards, local elected councillor representation disappeared10 and 16 district health
and social services committees, representative of public and consumer interests, were
replaced by an advisory structure of four area health and social services councils,
bodies with a consultative role and limited clout. All non-executive board appoint-
ments, their chairmen and members of advisory councils are by government appoint-
ment or in the gift of the minister. Early research on the newly constituted boards
suggests that non-executive directors are more likely to engage in rubber-stamping
decisions as their future appointment is dependent upon ministerial (or her advisors’)
approval. Not only do board members seek external political/ocial approbation,
but their relations with executive members (General Manager, Director of Public
Health, Director of Finance, etc.) are too close and interdependent. As a result, there
is a perception that they are ineective lobbyists for the consumer (Connolly and
Russell, 1993).
The second problem of accountability arises from appointments to the health and
social services trusts. Here too the chairman and members are government appoint-
ees, although the system provides the somewhat dubious concession that any member
of the public can make his or her interest known to the DHSS or health trust to be
considered for appointment. The ocial position is that all appointments are made
on the basis of merit and there are no formal criteria for appointment. Those
appointed, according to the Minister, are likely to have some or all of the following
attributes:
. an understanding of top management in a large organization;
. a relevant specialist skill or knowledge;
. experience of the voluntary sector, preferably at senior management or committee
level;
. living or working in the area to be served by the health trust;
. willingness to give the necessary time commitment (Moss, 1995).
In practice, however, research on the appointment system to boards in Northern
Ireland has concluded that there are
no stringent guidelines concerning who can be appointed and how they
must be approached. There are no stipulated criteria for selection and no
formal interviewing process. Ministers and senior civil servants therefore
have considerable freedom in the selection process . . . An examination of
the membership list of public bodies highlights the fact that each depart-
ment in the civil service has its own ‘players’ and these people are
consistently reappointed to sit on public bodies (Gray and Heenan, 1995,
pp. 66–67).
This position diers, however, in comparison with non-executive appointments in the
rest of the United Kingdom, where certain procedures such as advertisement, the
maintenance of a register of likely candidates and some form of interviewing are
required. This more robust, by comparison, system of accountability in Great Britain
10Prior to 1991, boards consisted of between 24 and 33 numbers, with up to 30% local councillors, 30%
professionals and the remainder drawn from industry, trade unions, universities and voluntary bodies.
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has itself been the subject of proposals for change under the Nolan Committee (1995),
set up to review ‘standards of public life’.11 The Nolan report recommended that all
appointments to non-departmental public bodies and NHS bodies should be made
after advice from a panel or committee that includes an independent element, com-
prising at least one-third of its membership. For the first time the appointments
procedure within departments should be monitored, regulated and approved by a new
independent Commissioner for Public Appointments.
The final accountability problem stems from the relationship between the DHSS
and the four health and social services boards, agents of the department. The diuse
nature of accountability procedures came in for severe criticism from the Parlia-
mentary Public Accounts Committee over the control of administrative manpower in
the Boards. The Committee took evidence from the Chief Executive of the Health and
Personal Social Services Management Executive on the rising cost of administrative
and clerical sta in the Boards and lack of manpower planning. The Management
Executive, whose Chief Executive is the parliamentary accounting ocer, provides
the link between the DHSS and its agent Boards. In defence of his position, the Chief
Executive tried to delineate the Boards’ responsibilities for operational decisions
aecting the delivery of services at the operational level, including the employment of
administrative and clerical sta, from his role in monitoring how Boards use their
sta. The Public Accounts Committee lambasted the Chief Executive for this
distinction:
It seemed to us that he (the Chief Executive) was trying to suggest that the
delegation to the Boards absolved him from being answerable to us on his
full accounting responsibilities, although he accepted that he is responsible
for ensuring that the services are provided in an ecient and cost-eective
way and provide good value for money. In referring to the wishes of
Ministers to leave more day-to-day decisions to Boards, he appeared to
interpret this as removing certain accounting responsibilities from him and
that we were assuming centralized control of the HISS, which was not the
case . . . Delegation to others in any large organization, regardless of
management structure or style, or whether the delegated authority is to
an agent, in no way removes the requirement for ultimate accounting
responsibility to be accepted (Committee of Public Accounts Thirty-Second
Report, 1991, p. ix).
The significance of this event is to highlight the accountability shortfalls which exist
over and above those built into the structural mechanisms for delivering public
services. It is inevitable that where multiple tiers of local governance exist, precise
responsibilities become dicult to define, further compounding accountability
problems in a system already described as government by appointment.
11Lord Nolan set out seven principles by which politicians and all those who service the public should be
bound. All public bodies should draw up codes of conduct based on selflessness, integrity, objectivity,
accountability, openness, honesty and leadership. All public bodies should also have systems of
independent scrutiny supporting their internal schemes for maintaining standards. It is perhaps ironic that
the Nolan inquiry into standards in public life was set up as a result, in part, of the activities of a former
Northern Ireland Junior Minister (Tim Smith) who resigned over accusations that he had accepted cash to
ask questions in the House of Commons.
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Social security is provided through a Next Steps Agency,12 the largest such agency
in Northern Ireland (employing around 4200 sta). The agency is subject to the
overall direction and control of the Secretary of State and the minister responsible, to
whom oversight of health and social services as a function is delegated. Ministers
determine the policy and financial framework within which the agency operates under
the direction of a chief executive, but do not normally become involved in its day-to-
day management. Members of Parliament and the general public are encouraged by
the minister to deal directly with the chief executive or appropriate agency manager
on matters and, if they remain dissatisfied with a reply, they may raise the issue with
the minister. It is for the minister to decide who should represent him or her at
Parliamentary Select Committees when the aairs of the agency are being discussed—
in practice this is normally the chief executive (Department of Health and Social
Services (NI), 1991).
Like government agencies throughout the United Kingdom, however, important
questions have been raised over the respective roles of ministers and chief executives,
creating opportunities to scapegoat responsibility for policy failures and abdicate
control of the agencies (Jordan, 1994). This has been described as the ‘bureaucratic
Bermuda Triangle’ in which accountability disappears (Treasury and Civil Service
Committee, 1994, para. 166; quoted in Butcher, 1995). A recent example (October
1995) in Great Britain where the Director General of the Prison Service (Derek Lewis)
was dismissed by the Home Secretary illustrates the point. A damning report
(Learmont) on the management of prisons, following the escape of three dangerous
prisoners from Parkhust gaol, led the minister to call for the director’s resignation.
The director refused on the grounds that there had been policy U-turns andministerial
interference in the day-to-day running of the service. As one commentator noted:
This distinction between policy and operations sounds neat but is uncon-
vincing. Executive agencies were supposed to produce clearer, more open
lines of responsibility, but it is impossible to separate the policy decisions of
ministers from the operational decisions of chief executives . . . Chief
Executives can be sure that their ministerial masters will ultimately be
willing to sacrifice them in the overriding cause of political self-preservation
(Riddell, 1995, p. 6).
Once again, adopting a British model of public administration, with its inherent
problems of accountability in the Northern Ireland context, serves to accentuate the
worst features of the ‘democratic deficit’.
Aside from the central machinery of government, and to add to its administrative
mosaic, Northern Ireland has its share of quangos or quasi-autonomous non-
governmental organizations.13 The most recent figures suggest that there are
12The Next Steps Initiative aimed to improve management in the Civil Service through greater eciency,
eectiveness and a better quality of service for the public. The Prime Minister (Mrs Thatcher) launched the
initiative in February 1988 following an Eciency Unit review carried out by Sir Robin Ibbs. Executive or
service delivery functions of government were separated from policy functions and located within self-
contained executive agencies. Each agency has a framework document agreed by the minister responsible.
The framework sets out the organization’s aims and objectives, governs the relationship of the agency with
ministers and parliament and lays down the financial and personnel arrangements within which it will
operate (Goldsworthy, 1991).
13There are major definitional problems in describing quangos. Hogwood (1995, p. 210), for example,
suggests that an ‘agreed, workable, inclusive and exclusive definition of type of body may not be possible to
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161 appointed executive quangos (Weir, 1994) set alongside 19 ‘Next Steps’ agencies,
38 advisory bodies and 15 tribunals, all for a population of 1.5 million. Quangos are
not a Northern Ireland-specific phenomenon and their increase UK-wide has been
the subject of a comprehensive review (Democratic Audit, 1994) which exposed the
extent of their growth and criticized their lack of accountability:
In area after area of public life, elected government is being replaced by
appointive government. Those who are elected count for ever less; those
who are appointed count for ever more. This hastily erected apparatus of
appointive government lacks the essential democratic underpinnings of
scrutiny, openness and accountability, but is now responsible for nearly a
third of central government spending (Weir, 1995, pp. 320–321).
Northern Ireland is the worst-case scenario in which quangos continue to evolve on
the back of an administrative system dogged by problems of electoral accountability.
Research carried out by the Northern Ireland Council for Voluntary Action on
quangos of most relevance to community and voluntary groups revealed a stark
absence of mechanisms for access or accountability. They concluded that in Northern
Ireland, where traditional accountability for service provision was largely absent, ‘this
context could be seen by quangocrats as a challenge to devise new processes’ . . .
instead it ‘has oered an excuse, at best, for avoiding the issue of accountability’
(Bradley, 1994, p. 26). Up until then the growth of quangos had received little
attention. The editor of a local newspaper (Ulster Newsletter) described their lack of
scrutiny as a result of press preoccupation with coverage of ‘the troubles’:
The Direct Rule government of Northern Ireland involves unelected
quangos running everything from health to education and the police. They
are not used to a probing press.There will be a lot of squealing pigs as
vested interests are investigated. While everyone has been talking about
turning swords into ploughshares, we in the press need to be turning
ploughshares into swords (Halon, 1995).
This overview of the public administration system in Northern Ireland would suggest
that the political problems which led to Direct Rule fromWestminster have implanted
an unaccountable framework within which major public services are delivered.
Set alongside this, the UK Government’s programme of public service reform, which
included privatization, competitive tendering, agentization and the creation of
internal markets, has compounded the ‘democratic deficit’ and conspired to produce
a system of public administration in Northern Ireland which has simply adopted
major reform initiatives without reference to the political context. The result of both
these factors is complacency and inertia among senior civil servants who do not
foresee any major changes in local governance without accompanying constitutional
progress at the political level. Whilst this may be true of the existing system of Direct
Rule, opportunities have emerged to improve public service delivery drawing on the
experiences of the most recent EC programme in Northern Ireland. We now review
the possibility of adopting or adapting the EC model of service delivery more
achieve’. Originally quangos were organizations which were not ocially part of government but were used
by government to deliver public policy. This changed and referred to bodies to which government made
public appointments. The government’s own preferred term is Non-Departmental Public Body (NDBP), a
term which includes selected executive bodies, advisory committees and tribunals.
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comprehensively within the existing system of public administration in Northern
Ireland.
EUROPEAN MODEL OF SERVICE DELIVERY—THE EC PEACE AND
RECONCILIATION INITIATIVE
In autumn 1994, following the cease-fires of the Irish Republic Army (IRA) and the
Combined Loyalist Military Command in Northern Ireland, a special European
Commission task force was set up to find ways to assist Northern Ireland and the
border counties towards maintaining the momentum for peace and reconciliation.
The task force concluded that the European Union had a clear interest in supporting
the peace process, not simply for the benefit of Northern Ireland as a region, but for
the European Union as a whole. As a result, the Commission adopted a proposal, the
Special Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border
Counties, to be implemented in the form of a Community Initiative14 under the
Structural Funds15 (Department of Finance and Personnel, 1995).
On 26 July 1995 the European Commission approved, following extensive con-
sultations,16 the details of the Special Support Programme for Peace and Recon-
ciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland 1995–1999. The
overall aim of the initiative is to
reinforce progress towards a peaceful and stable society and to promote
reconciliation by increasing economic development and employment, pro-
moting urban and rural regeneration, developing cross-border co-operation
and extending social inclusion (Commission of the European Communities
Oce in Northern Ireland, 1995).
Total expenditure under the programme for the first three years (1995–1997) will
amount to 416 MECU (£351m), of which 300 MECU is provided by the EU
Structural Funds17 (see Table 1 for allocation). Further financing for the final two
14The Community Initiatives are the special financial instruments of structural policy which the Commis-
sion proposes to the Member States on its own initiative, to support measures which will help solve
problems having a particular impact at European level. The Community Initiatives have three features
which give added value as compared with other measures financed by the Structural Funds: (1) support for
the development of transnational, cross-border and interregional co-operation; (2) a ‘bottom-up’ method
of implementation; and (3) the high profile on-the-spot which they give to Community measures
(European Commission, 1994).
15The Community’s Structural Funds are the ERDF (European Regional Development Fund), whose aim
is to reduce dierences in levels of development between regions in the Community, the ESF (European
Social Fund), which is responsible for improving employment prospects in the Community, and the
EAGGF Guidance Section (European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund), which part-finances
national aid schemes for agriculture and helps develop and diversify rural areas of the Community. There is
also the FIFG (Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance), which assists in the restructuring of the
fisheries sector.
16The final document setting out details of the ‘peace package’ incorporates the outputs from consultation
exercises undertaken in Newcastle, Co Down (29 March 1995), Cavan (20 April 1995) and the European
Parliament’s consultation conference in Belfast (11 April 1995).
17The five priority objectives of the structural policies for the period 1994–1999 are: Objective 1—
economic adjustment of regions whose development is lagging behind; Objective 2—economic conversion
of declining industrial areas; Objective 3—combating long-term unemployment and facilitating the inte-
gration into working life of young people and of persons exposed to exclusion from the labour market;
Objective 4—facilitating the adaptation of workers to industrial changes and to changes in production
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years is subject to a review based on a Commission report. Up to 80% of EU funding
will be for activities in Northern Ireland, not less than 20% for activities in the border
counties of Ireland, and a minimum of 15% of the entire package will be for activities
in a cross-border context. The EU will assist successful projects with up to 75% of the
cost, and matching funds for the remainder will come from a variety of sources,
including the private sector, community/voluntary groups, local authorities and
central government. All matching funds provided by central government will be fully
additional (Department of Finance and Personnel, 1995).
The programme has two strategic objectives:
. to promote the social inclusion of those at the margins of economic and social life;
. to exploit the opportunities and address the needs arising from the peace process in
order to boost economic growth and stimulate social and economic regeneration.
To attain these objectives, the programme has five priorities or subprogrammes.
Employment. To promote peace and reconciliation and respond to the oppor-
tunities and challenges of peace by boosting growth and employment and supporting
the redirection of redundant skills, as well as reinforcing eorts for the long-term
unemployed, those most aected by the conflict, and the young, and by encouraging
greater participation by women in the labour force.
Urban and rural regeneration. To promote peace and reconciliation by renewing
urban areas aected by multiple deprivation, especially by resourcing local residents
to tackle the social and environment needs within their communities; to promote
reconciliation in rural areas by encouraging activities which will help to bring the
communities in those areas together and by helping to develop the rural economy.
Cross-border development. To promote cross-border reconciliation and to exploit
the opportunities for increased cross-border development arising from the new
situation.
Social inclusion. To promote pathways to reconciliation by encouraging grass-roots
and cross-community co-operation, as well as action to address the specific diculties
faced by vulnerable groups and others at a disadvantage, such as victims, children,
Table 1. EC allocation of subprogrammes.
Subprogramme
Northern Ireland
(MECU)
Border counties
(MECU)
Employment 37.392 4.375
Urban and rural regeneration 37.894 12.000
Cross-border development 22.500 22.500
Social inclusion 57.340 13.125
Investment and development 37.880 7.063
Partnerships 44.220 —
Technical assistance 3.790 0.937
Total 241.006 60.000
systems; Objective 5(a)—adjustment of the processing and marketing structures for agricultural and
fisheries products; and Objective 5(b)—economic diversification of rural areas (European Commission,
1994). The European Social Fund will make a valuable contribution to the Social Inclusion and
Employment measures, but overall the European Regional Development Fund has been predominant in
the Peace and Reconciliation Programme.
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young people and those previously caught up with violence, including prisoners and
ex-prisoners.
Productive investment and industrial development. To promote reconciliation by
stimulating private sector investment, leading to sustainable employment and develop-
ment, especially in disadvantaged areas.
There are several innovative aspects to the programme.
. In all, over half the monies involved will be channelled through intermediate or
decentralized agencies and partnerships (see Figure 2).
. A special district partnership measure (details), applicable only to Northern
Ireland, will allow for partnerships in each District Council area which will bid for
monies relevant to all priorities (except cross-border development).
. Intermediary bodies, outside of government, in both Northern Ireland and
the border counties will be responsible for delivering several measures in the
programme.
Specifically within Northern Ireland (Figure 2 shows Northern Ireland and the
border counties), it is envisaged that more than half of the financial assistance can be
disbursed through intermediary bodies and just over 44 MECU will be delivered
through local partnerships. The aim is to ensure that, for the rest, no less than 50
MECU will be delivered by bodies independent of government, reflecting the spirit of
the initiative as a truly ‘bottom-up’ programme.
In addition to the subprogrammes listed above, there are two further subpro-
grammes which straddle the five priority areas.
Partnerships (applicable only in Northern Ireland). The model adopted by the
programme recognizes that partnerships are a means of harnessing the energies and
talents of local groups in pursuit of common goals. Partnerships, reflecting the
interests of their areas, must therefore comprise, one-third each: local councillors;
community/voluntary representatives; business and trade union interests, as well as
statutory organizations. Each district council area can only be represented by one
partnership and the resources will be notionally allocated on the basis of population
weighted by an index of deprivation. Each district partnership will be invited to bid
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Figure 2. Allocation of EC peace money.
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against the allocation for its area through a plan of action. This plan will detail the
actions/projects which, in the opinion of the partnership, are best calculated to
advance the aim and objectives of the initiative in its area. The actions may endorse
some or all of the measures across the various priorities in the initiative. District
partnerships submit their agreed plan of action to a central board (the Northern
Ireland Partnership Board) established to administer the subprogramme. This is
an executive body (also comprising representatives, one-third each, from local
authorities; voluntary/community sectors; business, trade unions, rural and farming)
which has full responsibility to agree plans within the resources available for each
district partnership.
Technical assistance. This subprogramme allows technical assistance to be used to
assist the development of proposals to promote the aims of the programme, to
strengthen and enhance its management, co-ordination and implementation and to
provide information and publicity.
THE WAY FORWARD
The single most important early lesson from this European initiative is the value of
partnerships in delivering public sector services in Northern Ireland. The three
equally represented public (local authorities), private and voluntary sector partner-
ship members have the opportunity, collectively, to deliver accountable, community-
driven programmes and, at the same time, act as a model for change in the current
system of public administration. Up until recently, local authorities, stripped of major
functional responsibilities in 1972, were responsible for a limited range of environ-
mental and leisure functions representing only 3% of public spending (Department of
Finance and Personnel and HM Treasury, 1995). The UK Government, given the
historical problems of discrimination and political wrangling within councils, had
been unwilling to trust the only remaining democratic forum in Northern Ireland with
major services. Things are changing, however. Local authorities have actively
embraced a community relations initiative, part-funded by government, in which
councils provide programmes to encourage cross-community contact, respect for
dierent cultural traditions and mutual understanding (Knox and Hughes, 1996).
They have, incrementally, expanded their very limited economic development role, in
co-operation with the major government agencies charged with job creation (LEDU
and IDB), through a proactive strategy of marketing their strengths to prospective
investors. Moreover, they have exhibited a degree of political responsibility through
power-sharing arrangements between the main parties and, in so doing, demonstrated
their capacity to work collectively for the good of each council area (Knox, 1996).
This is not to suggest that the formation of partnerships, central to the EC initia-
tive, is without problems. There has been some frustration over the pace of progress in
selecting representatives from the voluntary and business sectors; councillors
presented fewer diculties in this regard. Equally, suspicions of the voluntary and
business sectors usurping the role of elected representatives had to be confronted. In a
system characterized so completely by government appointees, doubts have gradually
disappeared and each sector now recognizes the respective valuable contributions
made to the programme. It was perhaps inevitable that a new model of public
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administration would demand certain cultural adjustments, but its benefits as a future
mechanism for major service delivery in Northern Ireland are clear:
. improved local accountability through democratic input to service delivery,
combined with a bottom-up community emphasis reflected through voluntary
and private sector contributions;
. ownership of public policy decisions at the local level where, hitherto, apathy and
helplessness, conditioned by Direct Rule, were the norm;
. breaking of the assumed link between macro-political progress and potential
changes to the undemocratic system of public administration in Northern Ireland;
. prospects for expanding the partnership model to encompass areas currently
administered by quangos;
. subjecting public sector ocials implementing policy to a degree of scrutiny
entirely consistent with the large public budgets over which they have respons-
ibility, but for which they have grown accustomed to autonomy.
CONCLUSIONS
The current system of public administration in Northern Ireland is patently
unsatisfactory. Direct Rule from Westminster since 1972 has become an excuse for
administrative intransigence. This has resulted in a subjugated population acquiescing
in a system which is seriously lacking in both political and administrative account-
ability. The assumption that no changes can be made to public service delivery in the
absence of progress on the constitutional front has created and embedded a plethora
of boards, trusts, quangos and Civil Service departments characterized by admin-
istrative indierence. The faltering nature of political progress makes imminent
structural reorganization unlikely. Yet within the existing system of local governance,
a model imposed by the European Community as a mechanism for delivering public
services provides an alternative. A partnership approach, in which councillors, the
private and voluntary sectors collaborate, oers the opportunity to mobilize a system
of service delivery where these sectoral interests had hitherto ceded power to
government appointees. It is of course ironic that local authorities are the locus for
this experiment in administrative change, given their erstwhile history of abuse in
public service delivery and democratic power. An opportunity now exists to build
upon the record of improved local government performance and embrace the more
confident voluntary and business sectors in a collective venture to shape and deliver
‘bottom-up’ public services.
Critics and scaremongers may well draw attention to current (but isolated) excesses
of some councils (Belfast in particular) and the opportunity for paramilitaries to
manipulate the private sector within this tripartite collective. Whilst undoubtedly
true, a momentum of self-help, euphoria and ‘no going back’ is now evident in
Northern Ireland. To exercise some leverage in shaping public services would assist
in breaking the cycle of helplessness endemic to a political system in stagnation for
26 years. For too long a concentration on the political and security problems of
Northern Ireland has diverted attention away from major administrative deficiencies.
Severing the link that binds political progress to administrative change oers the
opportunity to improve the system of public administration. Mobilizing councillors,
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the voluntary and private sectors could precipitate a groundswell of collaborative
community energy which forces the pace of compromise at the macro-political level.
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APPENDIX: NORTHERN IRELAND DEPARTMENTS
The Northern Ireland Oce (NIO) is directly responsible for political and constitu-
tional issues, security policy, prisons, criminal justice and police matters.
The Department of Agriculture (DANI) is responsible for the development of
agriculture, forestry and fishing in Northern Ireland. It is the agent of the (UK)
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF) in the administration of
schemes in Northern Ireland aecting the whole of the United Kingdom and is
involved with the application of EC agricultural policy.
The Department of Economic Development (DED) is responsible for providing the
appropriate framework for strengthening economic development in Northern Ire-
land. It promotes inward investment and the development of larger home industry,
enterprise and small businesses, tourism, training and employment, industrial
research and development and technology transfer.
The Department of Education (DENI) has central responsibility for policy and
planning for education and related services (arts, museums and libraries; youth, sport,
recreation and community services). Executive responsibility for the delivery of these
services rests almost entirely in the hands of the education and library boards, the
Council for Catholic Maintained Schools, district councils, higher education
institutions and other grant-aid bodies.
The Department of the Environment (DoE) has direct responsibility for, or exercises
certain controls over, a wide range of functions. These include planning, housing,
roads, transport, water and sewerage services, rates, ordnance survey, pollution
control, conservation and urban renewal.
The Department of Health and Social Services (DHSS) is responsible for three main
programmes: health and personal social services, social security and child support. It
also has responsibility for certain aspects of social legislation and administration
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(betting, gaming and lotteries, liquor licensing, club registration, shops and hare-
coursing).
The Department of Finance and Personnel (DFP) is responsible for the control of
expenditure of Northern Ireland departments, liaison with HM Treasury and the
NI Oce on financial matters, economic and social research and analysis, the
Citizen’s Charter Unit, the Government purchasing service, the Census Oce for
NI and the General Register Oce. It is also responsible for developing, formulating,
co-ordinating and monitoring the equal opportunities for the NI Civil Service
and for formulating policy and co-ordinating arrangements for personnel manage-
ment. The department provides a central oce eciency and information technology
service.
(Civil Service Year Book, 1996)
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